{"id":2938,"date":"2020-11-30T13:50:11","date_gmt":"2020-11-30T09:50:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/?p=2938"},"modified":"2020-11-30T13:50:11","modified_gmt":"2020-11-30T09:50:11","slug":"%d5%a7%d6%80%d5%ab%d5%af-%d5%a2%d5%a5%d5%b5%d5%b6%d5%b0%d5%b8%d6%84%d5%a5%d6%80-%d5%b0%d5%a1%d6%80%d5%bd%d5%bf%d5%b8%d6%82%d5%a9%d5%b5%d5%a1%d5%b6-%d5%ae%d5%a1%d5%a3%d5%b8%d6%82%d5%b4%d5%a8-%d5%a1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/hy\/%d5%a7%d6%80%d5%ab%d5%af-%d5%a2%d5%a5%d5%b5%d5%b6%d5%b0%d5%b8%d6%84%d5%a5%d6%80-%d5%b0%d5%a1%d6%80%d5%bd%d5%bf%d5%b8%d6%82%d5%a9%d5%b5%d5%a1%d5%b6-%d5%ae%d5%a1%d5%a3%d5%b8%d6%82%d5%b4%d5%a8-%d5%a1\/","title":{"rendered":"\u0537\u0580\u056b\u056f \u0532\u0565\u0575\u0576\u0570\u0578\u0584\u0565\u0580 – \u0540\u0561\u0580\u057d\u057f\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0561\u0576 \u056e\u0561\u0563\u0578\u0582\u0574\u0568 – \u0561\u0576\u0563\u056c."},"content":{"rendered":"

Eric Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth, Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Economics, (Boston: HBS, 2006).<\/strong><\/p>\n

p. 11 Three step formula:\u00a0 differentiate, select, amplify \u2013 creates the econosphere.<\/p>\n

biobabble \u2013<\/p>\n

p. 97 \u2013 Complexity Economics vs. Traditional Economics<\/p>\n

p. 373 \u2013 Cooperative Norms also have important effects on both adaptation and execution. In low-trust, low-cooperation environments, interactions between agents must be spelled out in great detail, with numerous rules and little flexibility. \u2026\u00a0 Norms that foster trust and cooperation allow people to use there brains to determine what is best, given the circumstances, creating both better performance and the possibility of experimentation and improvement.<\/p>\n

p. 419 \u2013 Human beings are neither inherently altruistic nor selfish; instead they are what researchers call conditional cooperators<\/em> and altruistic punishers.<\/em> Gintis and his colleagues refer to this type of behavior as strong reciprocity<\/em> and define it as \u201ca predisposition to cooperate with others, and to punish (even at personal cost if necessary) those who violate the norms of cooperation, even when it is implausible to expect these costs will be recovered a later date.\u201d . . .\u00a0 In essence, people try to follow the Golden Rule, but with a slight twist: do unto others as you would have them do unto you (i.e., conditional cooperation) \u2013 but if others don\u2019t do unto you, then nail them, even at personal cost to yourself (i.e., altruistic punishment).\u00a0 People have a highly developed sense of whom they can trust and whom they cannot, to whom they owe favors and who owes favors to them, and whether they are being taken advantage of.\u00a0 As the old adage says, \u201cFool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.\u201d<\/p>\n

p. 426 \u2013 Government as a fitness function shaper \u2013 policies that shape the fitness environment, while leaving Business Plan selection and amplification to market mechanisms.<\/p>\n

p. 430 Culture Matters: Grondona \u2013 (1) individual behavior, (2) cooperative behavior, (3) innovation.<\/p>\n

In the first category are norms related to individual behavior.\u00a0 These include norms that support a strong work ethic, individual accountability and a belief that you are the protagonist of your own life and not at the whim of gods or Big Men.\u00a0 Fatalism greatly reduces personal incentives.\u00a0\u00a0 It is also important to believe that there is a payoff to hard work and a moral life in this world, and not just in the next.\u00a0 Finally economically successful cultures appear to strike a balance between optimism that improvement is possible, and realism about one\u2019s current situation.<\/p>\n

In the second category are norms related to cooperative behavior.\u00a0 Foremost is a belief that life is a non-zero-sum game and that there are payoffs to cooperation.\u00a0 Societies that believe in a fixed pie of wealth have a diffult time engendering cooperation and tend to be low in mutual trust.\u00a0\u00a0 Consistent with our discussion of strong reciprocity it is important that the culture have norms that value generosity and fairness, but also sanction those who free ride and cheat.<\/p>\n

The third category contains norms related to innovation.\u00a0 Deductive-tinkering is much more effective if the deductive part is strong, and thus cultures that look to rational scientific explanations of the world rather than religious or magical explanations tend to be more innovative.\u00a0 Likewise, a culture needs to be tolerate of heresy and experimentation, as strict orthodoxy stifles innovation.\u00a0 Finally, it is important that the culture be supportive of competition and celebrate achievement, since overly egalitarian cultures reduce the incentives for risk taking.<\/p>\n

One final norm is important to all three categories:\u00a0 how people view time.\u00a0 Cultures that live for today (or, conversely, are mired in the past) have problems across the board, ranging from low work ethic, to an inability to engage in complex cooperation and low levels of investment in innovation.\u00a0\u00a0 Why work hard, and invest in cooperation and innovation if tomorrow doesn\u2019t matter?\u00a0\u00a0 In contrast, cultures that have an ethic of investing for tomorrow tend to value work, have high intergenerational savings rates, demonstrate and willingness to sacrifice shrot-term-pleasures for long-term gain, and enjoy high levels of cooperation.<\/p>\n

p. 431 – factors in African culture that have a negative economic impact: excessive concentrations of authority in individual Big Men (who often claim magical powers), and a view of time that focuses on the past and present, but not the future:\u00a0 \u201cWithout a dynamic perception of the future, there is no planning, no foresight, no scenario building, no policy to effect the course of events.\u201d<\/p>\n

Impact of those who believe the world is a zero-sum game vs. those who it is as a non-zero-sum game.<\/p>\n

p. 432 – If your beliefs are biased toward seeing the world as a zero-sum game, then your objective will be to get your slice of the pie. You will view someone else\u2019s gain as your loss, and your proclivity to cooperate will be low.\u00a0\u00a0 Rather than searching for new, more complex, and wealth-creating cooperative activities, people will invest ther energies in finding ways to capture a greater share of the existing wealth.\u00a0\u00a0 It is not hard to imagine that theivery, dishonosty, and corruption will be higher in such a zero-sum society.\u00a0\u00a0 The moral attitudes around such activities will also be different; for example, theft might be viewed as \u201cI\u2019m just taking my fair share\u201d from someone who has more than his or her rightful share.<\/p>\n

Now, imagine a population in which some agents think the economic pie is fixed, while others have a non-zerosum view.\u00a0 Overtime, as a non-zero-sum agents find ways to cooperative and create new wealth, they will be attacked by zero-sum agents trying to get their share.\u00a0\u00a0 This conflict will lower the returns to cooperation, and eventually, the non-zero-sum agents will learn that cooperation doesn\u2019t pay and become zero-sum agents themselves.\u00a0 Non-zerosum attitudes don\u2019t need to be an inherited, hard-wired trait. \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0One could have two populations in which people are born with the same natural distributions of attitudes and predispositions.\u00a0 But in a low-cooperation society, non-zero-sum attitudes are essentially beaten out of the agents over time and they eventually learn to become zero-sum agents.\u00a0\u00a0 When researches model these dynamics, they often find there is a tipping point:\u00a0 once a society is past a threshold ratio of non-cooperators versus cooperators in a population, it becomes very hard to maintain large scale cooperation, resulting in a \u201cpoverty trap.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 Such tipping points mean that the vagaries of history can send one society down the low cooperation path into a poverty trap, while another society with the same predispositions to cooperate might bootstrap its way to riches.\u00a0\u00a0 The dynamic interplay between cooperators and defectors can thus influence the evolution of norms and the level fo trust in a society.\u00a0\u00a0 Culture is not an immutable force; rather, it coevolves as people in a society interact with each other \u2013 culture is a product of history, and history is a product of culture.<\/p>\n

p. 434 Overly strong family ties can have a negative impact on development (Karla Hoff Arijit Sen)<\/p>\n

In northern European Protestant traditions, families tend to be defined as the immediate nuclear family of parents and children, with weaker ties to grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins.\u00a0\u00a0 In many african and South Asian traditions, the radius of family is larger and stronger, extending to grandparents, aunts, uncles, great aunts, great uncles, cousins, second cousins, and so on .\u00a0\u00a0 These extended-family societies also have very strong norms on the sharing of economic wealth among fmaily members.\u00a0 Richer family members are expected to help poorer family members.\u00a0 While the wam and fuzzy image of a large, extended family sharing with each other sounds very appealing and may have pscyhological and other benefits, in economic terms, it creates a basic problem.\u00a0 If you get a job, work hard, and accumulate a bit of savings, you will be rewarded by having your no-good, lazy second cousin come live with you, eat your food and generally sponge off your hard-eared wages\u00a0\u00a0 This is what economits call a moral hazard<\/em>.\u00a0\u00a0 Extended definitions of family create incentives for free riding and lower the returns to work and savings.\u00a0\u00a0 Hoff and Sen argue that not only does the extended family create problems at the individual level, but it can also further retard development as it extends into nepotism in business and government institutions.<\/p>\n

p. 431 \u2013 A society might have strong norms of tolerance and forgiveness (or attitudes toward authority that aggrandize getting away with breaking rules as long as you don\u2019t get caught) that allow cheating to proliferate, thus weaking its ability to create large-scale, stable cooperation and reducing its economic achievement. But the very same norms might make it a warm, friendly, and even peaceful society.<\/p>\n

p. 422 Hayek \u2013 epistemological problem with planned economics \u2013 The knowledge required to solve the problem of what to produce in an economy lies scattered all over society. It includes information on prferences embedded in people\u2019s heads, as well as information on costs, technologies, and so on. By the time we surveyed the entire population on their preferences for the 1010<\/sup> SKUs of goods and services in the economy (ignoring the fact that no one could complete such a survey in hir or her liftime), the information would be out of date as soon as it was collected.\u00a0\u00a0 Same with price.<\/p>\n

2. beyond our ability to process. Even if we could collect all the data needed, we would not be able to process it.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 . . . human deductive rationality is simply not up to the job of understanidng, predicting, and planning in a system as nonlinear and dynamic as the conomy.\u00a0\u00a0 Perfect rationality is just as unrealitic in socialist there as it is in Neoclassical theory.<\/p>\n

3. If we reject perfect rationality and instead rely on deductive-tinkering, then we need something to judge the success of our tinkering against: we need feedback on what are good Business Plans versus Bad Business plans.\u00a0\u00a0 Without market mechanisms to provide that feedback, we are stuck with Hayek\u2019s knowledge coordination problem.\u00a0\u00a0 In the absence of actual knowledge of what society wants, and with no mechanism for enforcing a selection of those things, the Big Man hierarch of the state will simply produce whatever it decides to produce.\u00a0 …\u00a0 The natural tendency of Big Man power hierarchies is to do things that serve the interest of the Big Men.\u00a0\u00a0 Thus, the fitness function in pure planned economices inevitably reflects the interest of the power hierarchies, and not those of society more boradly.<\/p>\n

neatly planned utopia\u00a0 vs. mess reality of a complex adaptive system.<\/p>\n

same with laws \u2013 without input from stakeholders and responsiveness to that input, the system produces rules that only serve the interest of the Big Man in a \u201cmanaged democracy.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Eric Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth, Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Economics, (Boston: HBS, 2006). p. 11 Three step formula:\u00a0 differentiate, select, amplify \u2013 creates the econosphere. biobabble \u2013 p. 97 \u2013 Complexity Economics vs. Traditional Economics p. 373 \u2013 Cooperative Norms also have important effects on both adaptation and execution. In low-trust, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":2817,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[263],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2938","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-263"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/hy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2938","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/hy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/hy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/hy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/hy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2938"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/hy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2938\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2939,"href":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/hy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2938\/revisions\/2939"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/hy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2817"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/hy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2938"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/hy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2938"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arak29.org\/hy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2938"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}