

ch.1. ln.. 4-5 Subject of the essay: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.

ch. 1, ln. 79-80 the rulers should be identified with the people, that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation

ch. 1, ln. 84-85 [The rulers'] power was but the nation's own power, concentrated, and in a form convenient for exercise.

ch. 1, ln. 114-120 The "people" who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the "self-government" spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest.

ch. 1, ln. 135 "the tyranny of the majority" is now generally included among the evils against which society is required to be on its guard.

ch. 1, ln. 340 the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him.

ch. 1 ln. 370 – Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.

ch. 1 ln. 471 – Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.

ch. 2, ln. 30 If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.

ch.2, ln. 64 few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility.

ch. 2, ln. 125 Men, and governments, must act to the best of their ability.

ch. 2, ln. 142 – on any matter not self-evident, there are ninety-nine persons totally incapable of judging of it, for one who is capable; and the capacity of the hundredth person is only comparative; for the majority of the eminent men of every past

generation held many opinions now known to be erroneous, and did or approved numerous things which no one will now justify.

ch. 2, ln. 210 – we have done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of.

ch 2, ln. 265 The truth of an opinion is part of its utility.

ch. 2, ln. 621 Our merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion.

There needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.

Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

[P]ersecution is an ordeal through which truth ought to pass, and always passes successfully, legal penalties being, in the end, powerless against truth, though sometimes beneficially effective against mischievous errors. (Mill then goes on to refute the universality of this statement. – SK)

[H]owever true it [an opinion] may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.

The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has left it on record that he always studied his adversary's case with as great, if not with still greater, intensity than even his own.

[I]n the absence of discussion The words which convey it [truth], cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small portion of those they were originally employed to communicate. Instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, there remain only a few phrases retained by rote; or, if any part, the shell and husk only of the meaning is retained, *the finer essence being lost.*

But when it has come to be an hereditary creed, and to be received passively, not actively – when the mind is no longer compelled, in the same degree as at first, to exercise its vital powers on the questions which its belief presents to it, there is a progressive tendency to forget all of the belief except the formularies, or to give it a dull and torpid assent, as if accepting it on trust dispensed with the necessity of realizing it in consciousness, or testing it by personal experience; until it almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human being.

Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there is no enemy in the field.

ch. 2, ln. 1054 – there are many truths of which the full meaning *cannot* be realized, until personal experience has brought it home.

ch. 3, ln. 160 Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.

The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors.

[C]onflicting doctrines, instead of being one true and the other false, share the truth between them; *Popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth. in the human mind, one-sidedness has always been the rule,*

[O]nly through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth.

["T]he end of man... is the ...development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole;" for this [the individuality of power and development] there are two requisites, "freedom, and a variety of situations;".

Persons of genius... are... a small minority; but in order to have them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow. Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom.

Ch. 4, ln. 410. Originality is the one thing which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of.

Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric. Eccentricity has always abounded when and where strength of character has abounded;

ch. 3, ln. 503 If a person possess any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode.

[T]he only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals.

But the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place.

I am not aware that any community has a right to force another to be civilized. So long as the sufferers by the bad law do not invoke assistance from other communities.

ch. 5, ln 12-3. The individual is not accountable society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interest of no person but himself.

Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people... are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his [the individual's] conduct.

ch 5, ln. 790 Where everything is done through the bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all.

ch. 5, ln. 910. The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it. A State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes – will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of the machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.